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The paper reflects on the conception of the phenomenon of fear employed in the international relations 
theory. A critique of understanding of fear as a rational incentive of conventional international 
relations theories paves the way for the notion of fear as an emotion. It is argued that the behaviour 
of states in international politics should be explained via their psychological and emotional aspects. 
The paper proposes to connect the arising of and experiencing fear with collective memory and 
the imagery entrenched in nations’ subconscious. It also proposes to distinguish the two levels of 
arising of and experiencing the emotion of fear, namely the attempt to consciously arouse fear 
and its nonconscious experience. On the first level, mnemonic-emotive agents consciously activate 
collective emotions via the nation’s collective memory. On the second, once the contents/imagery of 
the society’s subconscious are activated, the aroused emotions are nonconsciously experienced by the 
society. The paper offers a case study from the Lithuanian foreign policy: its relations with Russia. 
Discourse analysis of Lithuania–Russia relations, where President Dalia Grybauskaitė plays an 
active and important role in discourse formation, suggests that the formation of Lithuanian foreign 
policy, with regard to Russia, is affected by the emotion of fear.
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Introduction
The state as an entity that strives to strengthen its own security is a deeply 
entrenched conception in international relations studies. From a realist perspective, 
the state’s security is closely related to the potential power it has to deter or outweigh 
the threats that naturally arise in the inherently anarchic arena of international 
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relations. The permanence of threats, mutual distrust between the states and the 
natural goal to survive (understood as physical security or guaranteed sovereignty) 
are the key poles of the realist theory and the security dilemmas it addresses. In 
the context of the realist theory of international relations, fear – as a response to 
perceived threats – is therefore unproblematic. There, the focus is on the response 
the state makes to a threat rather than on how it understands and experiences 
it (e.g., by feeling anxiety or fear). In this respect, the relationship between the 
state and threats to it is not a psychological phenomenon. The underlying reason 
behind this was the rationalization of the phenomenon of fear and the resulting 
neutralization of its psychological and irrational content. On the one hand, this 
enabled a clear and methodologically rather strict perspective on the analysis of 
international political processes; while on the other hand, however, it resulted in 
a standardization of the phenomenon of fear. This precedent of rationalization of 
fear might have been responsible for the lack of a substantive boundary between 
what it means for a state to experience fear on the one hand and threat on the other 
hand, in the canonical scholarship on neorealist international relations theories, as 
well as its lack of detailed analysis of different cases of fear in states and the variety 
of reasons for fear experienced therein. Finally, there is no analysis whatsoever 
on who (the state as an institution? its elites? the society? the individual?) feels/
experiences fear and how. This last issue very characteristically demonstrates the 
consequences of rationalization of fear: not only did one of the key driving forces in 
international relations become vague and obscure, but it also lacked a clear subject 
(who is afraid) and a definition of the experience of fear (what the feeling means 
and how it expresses itself ). It is therefore necessary to take a closer look into the 
issue of fear in international politics and to search for new theoretical frameworks 
that enable a more adequate analysis of the complex and multifarious phenomenon 
of the experience of fear.
One of the promising frameworks for analysis of fear is suggested by the 
emerging and increasingly popular traditions of understanding emotions in the 
processes of international politics. Despite a lack of widely agreed-upon principles 
in international politics research, scholars have noted that the factors that influence 
and often decide international politics are the experienced emotions rather than 
rational calculation on the part of states, which is theoretically significant.1 This 
1 Rosati Jerealas A., ‘The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics’ International 
Studies Review, 2(3), (2000), 45–79; Mercer Jonathan, ‘Feeling Like a State: Social Emotion and 
Identity’, International Theory 6(3), (2014), 515-535; Hutchison, Emma and Bleiker, Roland, 
‘Theorizing emotions in world politics’, International Theory, Volume 6(3), (2014), 67–93; Mattern 
Janice Bially., ‘A Practice Theory of Emotion for International Relations’ in International Practices, 
ed. Adler E., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011; Khaled F., Fierke K. M., ‘A Clash of 
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latter ‘turn to emotions’ enables a view of the state as an organism that has not 
only the visible, conscious, rational Ego, but also the deep, hardly rationally 
explicable level of collective subconscious, which − according to Carl Gustav Jung 
− subordinates and affects the choices of Ego, being as it is the most powerful fact of 
the human world 2(Jung 1991). In other words, efforts to understand and explain 
the choices made by states with regard to, say, international politics, also necessitate 
the assessment of psychological state of the agent and the resulting consequences 
of its behaviour.
This paper follows Jonathan Mercer’s view that in explaining the behaviour 
of collective subjects, psychology should be seen as an ally, as opposed to an 
enemy, of rationality.3 The rationale here is that absolute rationality (understood 
either economically as per Adam Smith or bureaucratically as per Max Weber) is 
practically impossible in the social sphere.4 Emotions are a natural incentive for 
both the individual and the society.5 In other words, the methodological choice to 
explain behaviour by ignoring emotions or seeing them merely from the theoretical 
perspective of rational behaviour is, conceptually speaking, a sub-optimal one. The 
markedly rational charge of the realist international relations theory and its key 
notions, on the other hand, makes it possible to see the analysis of emotions in 
foreign policy as a way of extending the explanatory scope of various incentives 
that lead states to behave in ways that they do. In other words, it repays to consider 
the non-rational nature of the phenomenon of fear and try and uncover the 
subconscious contents of fear as an emotion. This paper attempts to explain the 
emotion of fear by employing the notion of collective memory understood as a 
collection of imagery, symbols and building blocks of thought in the collective 
subconscious. Collective memory is not only a historical and political notion but 
also a psychological one. Emotions that we experience, as well as the reasons behind 
Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East’, European Journal 
of International Relations 15(1), (2009), 67-93; Sautrette Paul, ‘You Dissin Me? Humiliation and 
post 9/11 Global Politics’, Review of International Studies, Volume 32(3) (2006), 495-522; Crawford, 
Neta C., ‘The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships’, 
International Security. 24(4) (2000), 116-156; Budryte D., Resende E., Memory and Trauma in 
International Relations Theories, cases and debates, Routledge, 2013.
2 Jung, C. G., The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious. London: Routledge, 1991.
3 Mercer, J., Approaching Emotion. Paper for the International Studies, Association, San Diego, 
1997. 
4 Simon H. A., Models of Man: Social and Rational, New York, 1957; Lasswell H. D., The Decision 
Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis, University of Maryland, College Park, 1956.
5 One might add that the claim that emotions affect the behaviour of societies does not warrant 
more scepticism than its opposite, namely the claim that this behaviour ought to be explained with 
reference to rational behaviour theories.
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them, are also closely linked to both the individual and the collective memory 
passed on to us. In order to understand the sources of fear (its reasons) and its 
expression (its experience), one therefore must take into account the function of 
collective memory.
In view of the discussion in this paper, the goal is to present a perspective of 
explaining fear as emotion, the arising and effects of which are indissociable from the 
contents of the nation’s subconscious. Employing the model of collective memory 
analysis6 by Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik, the paper proposes a framework for 
analysis of fear as an emotional arousal via the use of collective memory.
In light of the theoretical framework offered above, this paper analyzes the 
narrative of threat from Russia as construed by the Lithuanian President Dalia 
Grybauskaitė, who is constitutionally responsible for the formation of the country’s 
foreign policy. Following the occupation of Crimea and the instantaneously increased 
military vulnerability of Lithuania, the country’s official discourse has seen, it is 
argued, the formation of a highly emotionalized narrative of threat from Russia. The 
collective memory story lines that comprise this view, on the one hand, subsume the 
role of arguments that explain the threat, and on the other, indicate that there is a 
correlation between the understanding of the threat and the collective memory as a 
significant variable in ontological security. In other words, the (traumatic) narrative 
of the collective memory makes the threat from Russia a personal threat, making 
it into an emotion of fear. This is how the understanding of threat becomes not 
so much a practice of foreign policy (viz., there’s a threat to be neutralized) but an 
identity-forming experience (viz., there’s a threat to be experienced, to be consciously 
apprehended). We can thus see that emotions, as an interpretive lens, enable a new 
outlook on the processes of constructing the threat, the Other, and the I.
It should be noted that the paper does not aim for a comprehensive and 
nuanced analysis and assessment of the Lithuanian foreign policy discourse. Its 
focus is limited to an analysis of the content of President Grybauskaitė’s public 
statements in Lithuanian and international media, during events commemorating 
nationally important dates, and in her annual addresses to the parliament (between 
the Crimean occupation of 2014 and spring of 2016). The criterion for content 
selection is the invoking of collective memory narratives used to name, explain, 
and assess the potential, the effect, and the possible negative consequences of the 
threat from Russia. Another group of important criteria comprise imagery and 
metaphors used for describing and explaining Russia and its threat to the country.
6 Bernhard M., Kubik J., A Theory of the Politics of Memory, In Twenty Years After Communism: The 
Politics of Memory and Commemoration, edited by Bernhard, Michael and Kubik Jan. Oxford : 
Oxford University Press, 2014.
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On the Concepts of Fear
For quite some time now, international relations have been paradigmatically 
understood as the interaction between rational and autonomous agents. Realists 
and neo-realists alike claim that states, which − according to them − are essentially 
consumers of security, always act in very similar ways – that is, they attempt to gain 
power and influence with the goal to survive. Kenneth Waltz’s systemic theory holds 
that the number of units of power within the particular system is a key factor in 
any attempt to explain the state’s foreign policy. According to him, the distribution 
and structure of power determine both the state’s interests and the scope of their 
fulfilment.7
So the reasons for fear, according to Waltz, lie in the asymmetries of states’ 
powers, and the reaction to this resulting asymmetry is always the balancing of 
power. This realist line of reasoning therefore predicts that both the fear felt by any 
state as well as its reaction to it would be either identical or at least very similar 
compared with any other state.
Paul Schroeder, however, disagrees with the neorealists’ claims about the 
motives and incentives behind states’ behaviour. According to him, the realist theory 
is grounded in the principle of sameness, rather than processual understanding.8 
Similarly, Ned Lebow notes that conventional international relations theories, 
grounded as they are in structural as opposed to processual explanations, are bound 
to fail to grasp the real causes behind social processes.9 In this context of realist 
inclination towards generalisation, the notion of fear as it is felt by states is an issue 
that is both interesting and problematic.
The realist conception of international relations treats fear as a rational, rather 
than emotional practice of state’s behaviour. In short, the reasons for fear are exterior 
(viz., in the international system) rather than interior to the state (viz., in its identity 
and psychology). The inability effectively to take responsibility for oneself leads to 
danger. The rational stimulus of fear, under the realist conception, will therefore 
make states avoid such situations as threats to their sovereignty. In other words, this 
line of thinking throws all instances of fear in different states into the same basket, 
failing to observe any significant differences between them. This happens because 
fear, for the realist, is neither a political nor a psychological phenomenon. As such, 
7 Waltz, Kenneth., Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House, 1979.
8 Schroeder, Paul W., Why realism does not work well for international history (Whether or not it 
represents a degenerate in research strategy). In Realism and the balancing of power: A new debate, 
edited by John A. Vasquez & Colin Elman, 108–148. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003.
9 Lebow, Ned R., A Cultural Theory of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008.
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fear and danger are considered important only in so far as they point to the ways 
states react to them and to the events that caused them.
The notion of fear – as a socially constructed phenomenon – is suggested by 
the constructivists (as a process of the I-Other dichotomy) and some authors from 
the critical theory school of thought (e.g., David Campbell, who construes fear as 
a ‘writing process’). This theoretical perspective excludes danger and risk in them, 
while noting, on the other hand, that anything can count as risk, depending on 
the way the danger is analysed and the way the given event is assessed.10 Events or 
factors that we identify as danger become such only through our interpretation, 
and the process of interpretation is not necessarily grounded in objective factors.
However, both the constructivist and the liberal paradigms of international 
relations tend to underscore the dynamics of identity change as the key source of 
reasons for fear. Fear arises when the Other recedes from the I, and, following the 
liberalist line of thought, pays no heed to universal liberal values. In this respect, 
constructivists treat fear as a tool for affecting the audience (act of securitization) and 
to resolve national security problems (act of desecuritization). In other words, for 
constructivists, the fear of the Other plays a fairly rational and important function 
of both social construction (identity building) and social mobilisation (problem 
resolution). The liberalist notion of fear can also be described as a pragmatic one: 
fear arises when the rational and economically oriented principles of states’ co-
existence are violated.
All of this seems to suggest that the notion of fear, as it is employed in the 
conventional international relations research, has lost its emotional charge. In other 
words, despite the fact that emotions are usually regarded as irrational, the realist, 
constructivist and liberalist theories, by contrast, treat fear as a rational incentive.
The emotion of fear, I submit, expresses itself in the collectives of individuals 
as a phenomenon that is inexplicable within the confines of rationality. In other 
words, fear could be felt not because of the perceived asymmetry of power (pace 
realists) or a conscious effort to mobilise your peers against ‘the receding Other’. The 
experience of fear could and should be understood as no less emotional a process 
as the love of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet. Treating fear as emotion means 
that one considers its content to comprise non-conscious feelings that flood and 
animate the society, directing it towards behaviour that is not always rational. Of 
course, talking about non-consciously experienced emotions on the society level is 
somewhat unusual, and even more so in the context of international relations. The 
proposal to return emotions to the research on international processes faces pressure 
10 Campbell D., Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1992.
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from the worry that emotions generally might not be something that factors in 
politics, and especially international politics. It is often emphasised that emotions 
are the exclusive domain of psychology or even psychophysiology. It should be 
noted, however, that the last decade has seen a significant rise in both interest in 
and academic research on the role of emotions in international politics.11 Having 
said that, a single agreed-upon definition of emotions has not yet been found in this 
field of social sciences, let alone a unified methodology for analysing emotions.
Scholars who analyse emotions in international relations follow the principle 
of treating emotions as an essentially cultural phenomenon. That is, emotions are 
regarded not so much as a psychophysiological occurrence within an individual, 
coming to the fore together with suckling mother’s milk for the first time, but as a 
socio-political phenomenon that first appears in societal interaction.12 An overview 
of a few dozens of influential scholarly works13 on emotions in international relations 
suggests that emotions are emotional experiences of social subjects that arise in and 
receive their meaning from the context of a collective body. For example, Emma 
Hutchison and Roland Bleiker Emocijos, in their article ‘Theorising Emotions in 
World Politics’, conclude their analysis of different notions of emotions by saying 
that emotions are not a merely individual phenomenon: they also have a distinctive 
social charge, and thus require political theorising in addition to the psychological 
or the neurological one. Emotions do not fit the boundaries of physiology and 
psychology and may also be treated as a social and a normative phenomenon.14.
A number of scholars working on the phenomenon of emotions note that the 
prototype of a rational, gain-maximizing agent fails to explain, or is in principle 
unfit to explain, many of the frequent precedents in international relations, such 
as conflicts, security dilemmas, or growth in moral panic or nationalism. So, 
according to these scholars, the twists and turns in international relations are 
11 Mercer Jonathan, ‘Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity’, International Theory 6(3), 
(2014), 515-535; Hutchison Emma, Bleiker Roland, ‘Theorizing emotions in world politics’, 
International Theory, Volume 6(3), (2014), 67–93.
12 Armon J., The Thesis of Constructionism, in The Social Construction of Emotions, (ed.) Rom Harré. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
13 Rosati J.A., ‘The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics’, International Studies 
Review, 2(3), 2000, p. 45–79; Mercer Jonathan, ‘Feeling Like a State: Social Emotion and Identity’, 
International Theory 6(3), (2014), 515-535; Hutchison Emma, Bleiker Roland, ‘Theorizing emotions 
in world politics’, International Theory, Volume 6(3), (2014), 67–93; Mattern B., ‘A Practice 
Theory of Emotion for International Relations’ in International Practices, ed. Adler E., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011; Crawford Neta, ‘The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on 
Emotion and Emotional Relationships.’ International Security. 24(4), (2000), 116-156
14 Hutchison E., Bleiker R., ‘Theorizing Emotions in World Politics’, International Theory, 6(3), (2014), 
67–93.
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suggestive of more than just a mechanical reaction to exogenous stimuli. Emotional 
climate and emotional relations are not just highly important in negotiations and 
resolution of international conflicts - they often play a fundamental role there. 
The kind of emotional climate that prevails while trying to categorise this or that 
political subject, for example, will largely decide the nature of relations between 
the subjects in question. In other words, emotions play a very significant role in 
collective knowledge and learning. Emotions affect the selection, understanding, 
and assessment of facts and events; at high levels of risk the subject or the collective 
body might selectively ignore certain pieces of information.
The domination of emotion and culture of fear in international relations can 
have a wide variety of consequences for foreign policy. First, an active emotion 
of fear will increase the transnational and inter-institutional distrust, which can 
eventually turn into inter-societal distrust. The feeling of fear can also become a 
source of other emotions felt by one society towards another, such as anger and 
hatred. Finally, the existence of emotion of fear in transnational relations will make 
the resolution of transnational or even larger-scale conflicts very hard to attain. 
This is directly supported by the hypotheses of the classic conflictology scholar 
Alfred Lewis Coser, who argued that the stronger the emotions of parties to the 
conflict are, the stronger the conflict itself will be, and the actual reasons behind 
the conflict will also be harder to both identify and resolve.15
Another highly important aspect is the psychological understanding of the 
I and the Us. Emotional attachment, which cannot be explained with reference 
to a rational behaviour, is neatly captured by the notion of ontological security 
developed by Anthony Giddens.16 Ontological security is essentially the view that 
the subject (the state) understands security not via exogenous factors but rather, 
primarily, as the preservation of the unity and consistence of its identity. Here the 
threat relates to the disruption of identity inertia (the unity of identity, its organic 
sense of values), and security connects with preservation of the routine state of 
affairs by stabilising the relationship between the I and the Other.
The routinizing of both oneself in adverse environment and of one’s relationship 
with the other are emotional formulas or rituals that, once they’ve become part 
of everyday life, form a template for the subject’s behaviour and thinking. From 
this perspective, explaining the behaviour via a rational, exogenous standpoint is 
ineffective. This is because the very principle of establishing the ontological security 
15 Coser, Lewis A., ‘Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change’, The British Journal of Sociology 
8(3), (1957), 197-207.
16 Giddens A., Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, Stanford, California, 
1991.
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is based not on reflecting upon one’s understanding of the action but rather on the 
goal of aligning the action with the logic of routine accepted by the given identity. 
Here, the effort to routinize the I and the I-Other interaction practices may lead 
to a conflict between physical security and ontological security. As Jennifer Mitzen 
notes, even a harmful or doomed state of affairs in international relations may 
indicate ontological security, which means that states are even more conflict-prone 
than is commonly supposed.17 This can be seen as a victory of sorts for emotions 
over cold and rational thought.
The ontological security theory also helps delineate the notion of emotion of 
fear: this is a feeling of insecurity about oneself, of a loss of control over oneself and 
one’s environment. It is essentially objectified anxiety (viz., one that arises from or 
because of a specific threat).
One can therefore conclude that the field of international relations permits a 
treatment of fear also as an emotion. However, providing an outline for a definition 
of fear as emotion necessitates a de-rationalization of fear. Within the context of 
conventional international relations theories discussed above, this would entail: (1) 
a separation of reasons/causes of the feeling of fear from the structure and dynamics 
of the international system; (2) a separation of reasons/causes of the feeling of fear 
from the identity asymmetry dynamics.
Reasons and sources of the emotion of fear
The key issues when talking about fear are its reasons and sources. In view of 
the theory of ontological security outlined above, we can define the emotion of 
fear as an objectified anxiety that arises due to disrupted identity routine. For the 
purposes of this paper, it is worth noting that this description is useful for analysing 
the meaning of collective memory in the construction of the discourses of fear. 
Collective memory is one of the key elements of identity. It performs a particular 
role in orienting oneself in historical time, and thus of continuity, of defining one’s 
meaning in the geopolitical area, and of formation of expectations. Following Jörn 
Rüsen, we can say that collective memory is essentially a future-projection of the 
identity-based subject.18 In other words, collective memory gives the coordinates 
for the process of being oneself and producing oneself in historical time. For this 
17 Mitzen J., ‘Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma’, 
European Journal of International Relations 12(3), (2006), 341–370.
18 Rüsen J., Istorika, Vilnius: Margi raštai, 2007.
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reason, collective memory is an especially sensitive part of a society as a living 
organism. Any threats to its unity are therefore liable to disrupt the routine that 
preserves ontological security.
One of the sources of emotions found in a society is collective memory. 
More precisely, the emotion of fear arises when something or someone threatens 
collective memory (by denying or attempting to change it), or when the imagery 
passively present in the collective memory of the nation is resurrected. The ‘freed’ 
and ‘activated’ fear in such processes essentially bears no direct links with power and 
identity asymmetry and has little to do with the calculation of objective external 
factors. The feeling of fear arises through the activation of imagery dormant in the 
collective sub-conscious, the imagery that is now being relived anew and employed 
in an effort to explain and understand current events. In other words, fear arises 
when (i) the boundaries between collective memory imagery and reality are being 
erased, and/or (ii) the collective memory narratives that preserve ontological security 
and the unity of identity are under siege. These two aspects are interrelated.
So collective memory, and especially the process of its (re)construction, has 
to do with the creation and re-awakening of emotions experienced by the society 
(e.g., fear, anger, resentment, love, etc.). The emotion of fear in the society could 
therefore express itself via the actualisation of the fear-inducing collective memory. 
Collective fear is generated, for example, through the escalation of the possibility 
of the repetition of past traumas, such as mass deportations, genocide, military 
occupation, war, natural disasters, etc. In other words, collective memories and 
contemplation of the threats and tragedies experienced in the past can lead to 
the feeling of fear at present. Essentially, this is a fear of loss of Oneself, born in 
the endogenous structure of identity as opposed to the exogenous structure of 
international order.
Agents of fear: activating the emotion of fear
It should be noted that society (as a mass of people) is far more complicated 
and intricate a unit than, say, an individual. One society does not directly partake 
in or interact with another society, nor does it directly touch upon (as a subject) 
the traumatic, emotion-inducing events. So the emotions that arise on the societal 
level cannot simultaneously arise in all citizens, when, say, there’s a quarrel between 
two heads of states. This is to say that collective emotions arise and fade away in a 
far slower manner. Because society does not exist as a real, as opposed to abstract, 
body or entity, the responsibility for the arising of emotions lies in certain ‘societal 
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bodies’. Usually, these are politicians who are well aware of the role and the meaning 
of emotions in mobilising the masses.
This paper proceeds by introducing a case of constructing the emotion of 
fear when the state encounters a threat. We should note at the outset that the 
methodological guidelines for analysing the emotion of fear do not aim for 
a comprehensive analysis of the creation of discourse of fear. As per above, the 
emotion of fear is an objectified feeling of ontological insecurity. The source and 
expression of fear are thus localised in a very wide spectrum of social practices 
and experiences. This is why particular politicians and institutions can control the 
systems of emotions in the society only to an extent. That is, they can be said to 
employ those systems of emotions rather than create them. So, the case of emotions 
generated by the mnemonic-emotive agents discussed below encompasses only a 
part of the process of the societal emotion formation and expression.
In light of the fact that the said ‘societal bodies’ play a role in the creation of 
emotions, it is useful to distinguish between the two stages of feeling the emotion on 
a societal level: (1) conscious rousing of the emotion; (2) non-conscious experience 
of the emotion.
The first stage is a kind of a prelude to the emotion. This prelude could be 
purposeful, but this stage is not yet that of a collective emotion. At this stage, 
the emotion has not yet come to ‘fruition’. What we call a collective emotion 
is expressed in the second stage. Here, the society, just like a monolithic entity, 
undergoes the exact same feeling and experiences the same consequences of it. This 
feeling experienced at the societal level is non-conscious. Therefore, the expression 
of such a feeling on the societal level (e.g., fear, hatred, remorse, etc.) is essentially 
uncontrolled and not reflected upon. So, it is the emotion itself, experienced by the 
society, rather than its causes, that will be guiding its subsequent actions.
When it comes to forming emotions with regard to foreign policy, the 
key agents that construct and preserve them are political leaders (e.g., heads of 
states, government leaders, cabinet members, elected politicians, etc.) entrusted 
with decision-making powers. Political leaders are constantly in the public eye, 
and therefore enjoy the prerogative of forming the public opinion, beliefs, and 
emotions. Seeking political power and legitimisation, such agents often turn to 
and try to make use of history, that is, make collective memory of the society serve 
their own ends.
Whenever these agents touch upon collective memory, which itself forms an 
essential building block of the I, this is guaranteed to cause a stir in the public. 
Therefore, the golden age of the nation will be recollected with nostalgia (Austria is 
a case in point here), great military victories will be a source of pride and high self-
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esteem (the UK), mistakes of the past will cause shame and remorse (Germany), 
and lost battles – anger and humiliation (Russia). In other words, a brush with 
collective memory is never cold and dispassionate; any frustration with it (e.g., 
an attempt to question, rewrite, or even to deny collective memory) or transfer 
of traumatic memories to the present will cause an emotional response. For this 
reason, the agents who seek to employ the narratives of the past in order to mobilise 
the masses will also at the same time be the awakeners of emotions. Supplementing 
Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik’s theoretical model of the politics of memory,19 
we can call these agents not just mnemonic agents, but rather mnemonic-emotive 
agents.
Utilising the politics of memory, mnemonic-emotive agents generate emotions 
with a view to strengthening or legitimising their current political standing. 
Emotions experienced on the societal level (if they are successfully transferred to 
the non-conscious experience discussed above) can therefore help these mnemonic-
emotive agents control and guide the masses.
Paradoxically, these attempts, on the part of mnemonic-emotive agents, to 
participate in governmental processes and to control public resources set certain 
constraints on the ways in which the collective memory and emotions can be 
constructed. Getting a good understanding of these constraints is crucial if we are 
to explain the reasons for and content of the fear society experiences.
Mnemonic-emotive agents, first and foremost, seek to appear reliable and 
significant to their audience(s), whose collective memory is to be constructed. Each 
audience, due to its unique historical, cultural, and institutional experience, will 
react differently towards suggested perspectives on collective memory and towards 
the emotions that are activated. To put it briefly, there is a certain gravitational 
pull of discursive meanings, which, on the one hand, sets certain constraints on 
power-seeking mnemonic-emotive agents with respect to acceptable interpretations 
and symbolic meanings; however, these constraints (and especially their denial or 
neglect) are crucial in the construction of negative emotions. To give an example, 
the limits of tolerance in Germany are such that under no circumstances should 
one question the fact of the Nazi crimes; while in the Baltic states, it is the fact of 
the USSR occupation that one should not tamper with. The activation of negative 
emotions has to do with a sort of an escape from the gravitational pull of this 
grand narrative of the nation. For instance, the negation of the fact of the USSR 
occupation in the Baltic states incites negative emotions (such as anger and fear), 
19 Bernhard M., Kubik J., A Theory of the Politics of Memory, In Twenty Years After Communism: The 
Politics of Memory and Commemoration, edited by Bernhard, Michael and Kubik Jan. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014.
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so the mnemonic-emotive agents who attempt to question this fact entrenched in 
the collective memory will be at high risk either of joining the ranks of ludicrous 
marginal figures or of being pronounced the enemy of the nation that is to be feared. 
A good example here is Algirdas Paleckis, a Lithuanian politician who insisted that 
on 13 January 1990 ‘our own people were shooting at our own people’. At the same 
time, Russia’s politics of questioning the fact of occupation and the crimes of USSR 
is becoming an important source of collective emotion of fear in Lithuania. So, for 
example, a neutral memory of Stalin, on the part of Russian students, and the fact 
that the association that comes to their minds is that of a nice moustache20 rather 
than the repressions and terror suffered by Lithuania, will be a source not just of 
suspicion among Lithuanians, but also of fear.
Emotion of fear in Lithuanian foreign policy
I will now proceed with a further analysis as to why and how Lithuania’s fear 
of Russia became an active and significant emotion in Lithuanian foreign policy. 
It should be noted at this point that the narrative of Russia as Lithuania’s eternal 
enemy to national security dates back to Lithuania’s declaration of independence.21 
Part of Lithuania’s right-wing political elite in particular would often promote, in 
public discourse, the idea of Russia as ‘the empire of evil’, ‘a potential invader’, or 
‘a geopolitical rival’. Nevertheless, such a narrative of a threat, based as it often was 
on historical grievances and emotional experiences, did not become the dominant 
view until as late as 2014. In both official and public discourse, this latter viewpoint 
had been counterbalanced by other perspectives that were oriented elsewhere 
than towards collective memory. These different viewpoints were commonly 
supplemented with the image of Russia as an ‘economic partner’, a ‘geographical 
neighbour’, which − to an extent − halted the maximisation and stereotyping of 
the fear of Russia. This is neatly illustrated by the fact that even after the Georgia-
Russia war, Lithuanian politicians sought to develop pragmatic Lithuania-Russia 
relations and even to ‘reset’ them. The programme of the 16th Government of 
Lithuania, for instance, underscored such a ‘reset’, as well as the need to focus on 
the future, not the past, in developing its relations with Russia.22
20 Kasamara V., Sorokina A., ‘Post-Soviet collective memory: Russian youths about Soviet past’, 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 48, (2015), 137-145.
21 Brunalas Benas, ‘The concept of fear and emotions in the foreign policy of Lithuania’, Lithuanian 
Annual Strategic Review, 2015-2016, vol. 14, (2016),197-223.
22 See the programme here: <https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/TAIS.439761>, 2017-07-07.
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Mnemonic-emotive agent in the construction of fear: Dalia Grybauskaitė
We now turn to the public statements of a mnemonic-emotive agent who 
played an extremely significant role in the formation of Lithuania’s discourse of the 
threat from Russia. This is the President Dalia Grybauskaitė, who is now serving 
her second term in office. In 2009, President Grybauskaitė set out to reform the 
foreign policy propagated by her predecessor, President Valdas Adamkus, implying 
that it had been too declaratory and ceremonial. In her annual 2012 address to the 
parliament, Grybauskaitė stated the following: ‘My priority lies not in ceremonial 
meetings or solemn declarations, but in constructive dialogue and value-based 
negotiations.’23 She has always emphasised the need for a pragmatic approach. 
Grybauskaitė can be said to have performed the function of a mnemonic visionary 
– having turned away from the past, she was consolidating the political energy 
towards building a better future.
However, since Russia’s occupation of Crimea, Grybauskaitė’s foreign policy 
vision, which had underscored pragmatic values and the construction of politics by 
‘looking towards the future, not the past’, has been undergoing a transformation. 
This transformation meant that not only did collective traumatic memories return 
to our foreign policy (specifically, to Lithuania-Russia relations), but also that the 
‘emotions’ that were to be swept aside until then were now activated.
It is noteworthy that there are multiple reasons behind the shift of Lithuania’s 
policy towards Russia. Russia’s occupation of Crimea and the resulting violation of 
international law, its military involvement in Eastern Ukraine and Syria all led to 
a change in the geopolitical reality of the region. It is therefore only natural that 
security policies of Lithuania and other Baltic countries would also change. However, 
the geopolitical factors and Russian aggression in Ukraine do not by themselves 
account for the discursive practices that arose. In other words, the identification 
of a threat and the construction of the discourse of fear are not identical processes. 
The understanding of a threat can express itself in practice in different ways. The 
Estonian president Kersti Kaljulaid, for example, who underscores the effectiveness 
of NATO’s deterrence policy, sees no threat from Russia at all to the physical 
security of the Baltic States or of any other NATO member state.24 And she is not 
the only highly-ranked official responsible for Estonia’s foreign policy who shares 
this view. Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Marina Kaljurand remarked, in the 
23 See her annual address here: < https://www.lrp.lt/lt/pranesimas2016>
24 Estonian President Kaljulaid: ‘I don’t believe that Russia would attack a NATO country’, 2017-18-
05, <http://www.dw.com/en/estonian-president-kaljulaid-i-dont-believe-that-russia-would-attack-
a-nato-country/a-38889319>,2017-07-07.
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context of the expansion of NATO’s military presence in Estonia in 2015, that she 
sees no threat from Russia to Estonia’s physical security, as the country is a member 
of both the EU and NATO.25 The emphasis in this case lies on the strength of 
defensive capabilities in the face of a threat from Russia.
The rhetoric of President Grybauskaitė, on the other hand, contains no 
suggestion that Lithuania, also a member of the EU and NATO, sees no direct threat 
to its sovereignty, despite similarities with Estonia with respect to the geopolitical 
situation and military vulnerability. Grybauskaitė’s public statements often allude 
to Russia’s aggression, brutality, unpredictability, and its threat to the survival of 
Lithuania. Such a form of discourse seems to suggest that the country’s reaction 
to the new threat has to do not only with changes in the neighbourhood, but also 
depends on internal factors such as Lithuania’s political culture and foreign policy 
tradition, formation of the country’s foreign policy identity, collective memory, the 
(psychological) personality of the leader(s), etc.
I proceed with a more detailed explanation of the formation of the Lithuanian 
discourse of threat from Russia within the framework of ontological security (or 
psychological comfort) as per above. The case at hand shows that certain story lines 
from the collective memory became guiding principles in the formation of the 
understanding of said threat.
Voicing her opinions on the events that followed the occupation of Crimea, 
the president often compares the direction of Russian foreign policy to those of 
Stalin and Hitler, and discussing the future trends of relations between Russia and 
Ukraine on the one hand and Russia and the West on the other, she invokes the 
ominous imagery of the Holocaust and the divisions of Europe.26 In other words, the 
President employs historical imagery to induce fear and dread with regard to current 
affairs and their possible future trends. Associations of this sort are very common 
in her rhetoric. When she talks about Russia and the changing geopolitical reality, 
the President connects, either directly or indirectly, what is happening now to what 
was done by Stalin and Hitler. It must of course be admitted that such imagery had 
not been entirely absent from the Lithuanian discourse before, when talking about 
Russia and Putin. However, as I mentioned above, this sort of imagery had not 
been this active and was largely absent from the discourse on an official level.
Grybauskaitė used the imagery of collective memory not only as a means for 
25 Formin: Estonia needs to ensure security although it doesn’t see threat coming from Russia, 2015-
12-07., <http://www.leta.lv/eng/defence_matters_eng/defence_matters_eng/news/A328DAEB-
59DE-4790-A5D4-A6CFDB6F1AFB/ >,2017-07-07.
26 ‘Teisė žinoti’. 2014-03-11, ‘Interview with Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė’, <https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=Q9VQudWvIoE>,2017-07-07.
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invoking fear, but also as a tool for intimidation/motivation. In the contexts of 
war, military occupations, and mass deportations, the President emphasised the 
imagery of vigour, invincibility, heroic resistance, and patriotism. For example, 
in her speech on the Day of Commemoration of Partisans (17 May 2014), the 
president said: ‘Our love for our country had not been quenched by the crusaders, 
had not been taken away in cattle carriages, and nor will it be destroyed the 
propaganda of antagonistic forces, for we cannot live without Lithuania.’27 In this 
way, the President seems to direct the energy created by fear towards strengthening 
both will and power to resist. On the other hand, the traumatic events of the past 
and symbols that represent them, such as ‘cattle carriages’ (which symbolise threat 
and trampling over the nation) and ‘crusaders’ (which symbolise both threat and 
the will and power of the nation to resist), are juxtaposed with Russian information 
operations of the present day. In other words, these symbols are meant to serve as 
signposts of the existential significance of present-day events, of the real intentions 
of the source of threat, and finally, of the actions to be taken and emotions to be 
felt by everyone observing the current course of Russian foreign policy.
The strength of all these associations is aided by the considerable attention 
paid to ‘sketching’ Putin’s portrait. In Grybauskaitė’s speeches, Putin personifies 
not only Stalin, Hitler, an imperialist, a villain, or a terrorist, she also underscores 
Putin’s other characteristics that cause fear or at least anxiety, such as pathology and 
brutality. Grybauskaitė bluntly states that Putin is ‘characterised by aggressiveness, 
violence, and a willingness to overstep boundaries’ exactly to the extent of someone 
suffering from a psychiatric disorder. It is very important to note that in her 
speeches Grybauskaitė often neglects to draw a clear line between Putin and Russia. 
Appearing on the national broadcaster TV programme ‘Teisė žinoti’, she insisted 
that ‘It [Russia – B. B.] has ceased to have its own face long ago, there’s only the 
face of Putin now.’ 28
It can be said that the President’s narrative endows Putin, as the image of 
Russia itself, with the role of ‘an embodiment of evil’, of ‘perfection of evil’. 
The force of this imagery is strengthened by continuous references to traumatic 
collective memory tropes and vivid juxtapositions, for example, ‘brutal behaviour’,29 
27 ‘Lietuvos Respublikos Prezidentės Dalios Grybauskaitės kalba Partizanų pagerbimo, kariuomenės ir 
visuomenės vienybės dienos šventėje’, 2014-05-17, < https://www.lrp.lt/lt/prezidentes-veikla/kalbos/
lietuvos-respublikos-prezidentes-dalios-grybauskaites-kalba-partizanu-pagerbimo-kariuomenes-ir-
visuomenes-vienybes-dienos-sventeje/19330>, 2017-07-08.
28 ‘Teisė žinoti’. 2014-03-11, ‘Interview with Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite’, <https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=Q9VQudWvIoE>,2017-07-07.
29 ‘Teisė žinoti’.
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‘pathological imperialism’,30 ‘Russia’s grand chauvinism’,31 ‘Russian predation’,32 
‘Russia’s war with Europe’,33 ‘blood shedding’,34 ‘killing of innocents’,35 ‘crimes 
against humanity’,36 ‘terrorist state’,37 and so on.
Finally, we come to one of the most resonant epithets that Grybauskaitė used to 
describe Russia – that of a ‘terrorist state’. This way of summarising Russian foreign 
policy, by likening it to acts of terror, completes the spectrum of easily recognisable 
and fear-invoking imagery that can be given to a state, that is, the Stalinist state, 
the Nazi state, the barbaric state, the collapsing state, and the terrorist state. The 
diagnosis of Russia as a terrorist state is particularly significant from an emotional 
perspective, because in the eyes of public, Russia is likened to the Islamic State 
run by fundamentalist extremists. Grybauskaitė underscores this by saying that 
sooner or later we will be calling Putin a terrorist and a criminal.38 This assigned 
imagery of the aggression of the present day is highly important in an attempt to 
connect the oft articulated past (Stalinism, Hitlerism, crusaders, the Soviets) with 
the postmodern reality of today (terrorism). In other words, this serves to increase 
the contemporary relevance and reality of imagery of the past. In this way, no room 
30 ‘Teisė žinoti’. 
31 ‘Lithuania President Warns of Growing “Russian Chauvinism”’, 2014-06-08, < https://www.
voanews.com/a/lithuania-president-warns-of-growing-russian-chauvinism/1952900.html>, 2017-
06-06.
32 ‘Lietuvos Respublikos Prezidentės Dalios Grybauskaitės kalba Lietuvos kariuomenės vado pasikeitimo 
ceremonijoje’, 2014-07-24, < https://www.lrp.lt/lt/prezidentes-veikla/kalbos/lietuvos-respublikos-
prezidentes-dalios-grybauskaites-kalba-lietuvos-kariuomenes-vado-pasikeitimo-ceremonijoje/19979 
>, 2017-05-07.
33 LRT, ‘“Prezidentė: kaltieji dėl lėktuvo katastrofos turi keliauti į Hagos tribunolą’, 2014-07-22, < 
http://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/53313 >, 2017-02-03.
34 ‘Russia Fighting Open War Against Ukraine, Lithuanian Leader Says’, 2015-01-23, < https://www.
lrp.lt/en/press-centre/president-in-the-media/russia-fighting-open-war-against-ukraine-lithuanian-
leader-says/21790 >, 2017-02-03.




36 ‘Prezidentės komentaras “Lietuvos radijui” apie vizitą Varšuvoje’, 2014-07-22, < https://www.lrp.lt/
lt/prezidentes-komentaras-lietuvos-radijui-apie-vizita-varsuvoje/21678>, 2017-01-03.









is left in the imagination of masses for a ‘different’ and ‘better’ Russia. In both past 
and present, or in the same way in present as in the past, Russia is to be seen at 
the epicentre of evil on the global scene. In other words, even though the form of 
Russia has been changing, its content for hundreds of years right up to the present 
has remained the same.
Emotional/identity shifts and transfers
Analysis of remarks by the President and other politicians and of the narratives 
active in the public sphere suggests that geopolitical reality is often explained via 
the contextualised shift towards the events of past. Such shifts play a crucial role 
in the construction of fear. It can therefore be said that the reasons for fear felt in 
Lithuania are not just geopolitical; they are at least just as much geo-emotional. So, 
the fact of the changed geopolitical reality has been swept away from the public 
and official discourse, giving way to an imagery of imperialism pursued by Russia, 
analogous with the Soviet and Tsarist expansionism. In other words, we can talk of 
discursive shifts towards the past, and see that the function of collective memory is 
not so much that of explaining the reality but that of experiencing it.
If we are to understand the content of fear that is deeply entrenched in 
Lithuania, this context is highly important. We should also appreciate its difference 
from collective memory imagery discussed above, which mainly served to help 
understand the character and goals of the object of threat. This emotional, identity 
shift puts us into contact with and lets us experience the threat. More precisely, it 
enables us to collectively experience it again.
So, the vast quantities of emotionally-charged messages in the Lithuanian press 
about the aggression exerted by Russia in a way transferred the country back, on the 
level of discourse, to the 1940 Soviet occupation, mass deportations, collectivization, 
etc. It is therefore easy to see why the Lithuanian discourse was dominated by the 
‘fact’ of Russia’s imminent attack. The emotional charge of public discourse was as if 
Lithuanians had already undergone the fact of Russia’s military intervention.
For example, there were quite a few articles in one of Lithuania’s most popular 
internet websites in 2014−16 that contain references, whether in the headlines or 
the content itself, to the idea that Russia intends to attack Lithuania and the Baltic 
states: ‘Plan to divide “Pribaltika”: Who was actually writing secret instructions’,39 
39 ‘Planas, kaip padalinti “Pribaltiką”: kas iš tiesų slapta rašė instrukcijas’, 2017-03-21 <http://
www.delfi.lt/news/daily/demaskuok/planas-kaip-padalinti-pribaltika-kas-is-tiesu-slapta-rase-
instrukcijas.d?id=74107364>,2017-07-07.
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‘Political preparations for occupying Baltic states under way’,40 ‘War in the Baltics: 
What Moscow’s scenario might look like’,41 ‘Lithuania’s great embarrassment: 
We could, and should, have resisted. What was stopping us?’,42 ‘World’s paranoia 
turned out correct – Putin is not kidding and starts a new Cold War’,43 and so on.
The fact that the content of news media influenced public opinion is 
demonstrated by a work of Lithuanian sociologists that analyses subjective 
understanding of threats to Lithuania. To investigate the spontaneous grasp of 
threats, the questionnaire begins with a direct request to specify what comes to the 
respondent’s mind when they are asked whether or not they feel safe. The analysis 
of answers has shown that in 2016, the threat of Russia’s military invasion was 
understood as the greatest threat to personal security (21 per cent of respondents).44 
Even though, as the sociologists themselves note, such responses might have been 
primed by certain aspects of the questionnaire itself (this was the very first question; 
also, Russia was mentioned in the questionnaire’s title), the narrative of the Russian 
invasion is quite prominent and apprehended as a threat to personal security.
By the same token, Lithuanians, as it were, reincarnated themselves as 
Ukrainians identity-wise. In speeches of politicians, as well as in the mass media 
generally, the attack on Ukraine was an attack on Lithuania. In the newly developing 
discourse, Lithuanians, so to speak, felt Ukrainians’ pain. This is nicely illustrated 
by a documentary by Paul King, tellingly titled ‘Blood Brothers? Why Lithuanians 
feel Ukraine’s pain ... and how they avoided the same fate.’ We can find more 
instances of identity shifts of this kind. For example, Grybauskaitė’s speeches 
portray Ukraine’s fight with Russia in the backdrop of the Baltic Way, a hugely 
significant event in Lithuania’s history, as if Ukraine were the fourth country to 
hold hands with us on that memorable day.45
40 ‘M. Laurinavičius. Politinis pasirengimas Baltijos šalių okupacijai jau prasidėjo’, 2015-04-28 
<http://www.delfi.lt/archive/m-laurinavicius-politinis-pasirengimas-baltijos-saliu-okupacijai-jau-
prasidejo.d?id=67820880>2017-07-07.
41 ‘Karas Baltijos regione: koks gali būti Maskvos scenarijus’, 2015-07-04 <http://www.delfi.lt/news/
daily/lithuania/karas-baltijos-regione-koks-gali-buti-maskvos-scenarijus.d?id=68397954>.
42 ‘Didžioji Lietuvos gėda: priešintis ir galėjome, ir privalėjome, o kas sutrukdė?’, 2016-06-15 
<http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/didzioji-lietuvos-geda-priesintis-ir-galejome-ir-
privalejome-o-kas-sutrukde.d?id=71558054>, 2017-07-07.
43 ‘Pasaulio paranoja pasitvirtino – V. Putinas nejuokauja ir pradeda Šaltąjį karą’, 2016-10-22 
<http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/world/pasaulio-paranoja-pasitvirtino-v-putinas-nejuokauja-ir-
pradeda-saltaji-kara.d?id=72594842>,2017-07-07.
44 Janušauskienė D., Vileikienė E., Nevinskaitė L., Gečienė I., Subjektyvus grėsmių suvokimas: ar 
Lietuvos gyventojai jaučiasi saugūs?, Filosofija. Sociologija. 2017. T. 28. Nr. 2, p. 99–108.
45 ‘Lietuvos Respublikos Prezidentės Dalios Grybauskaitės kalba Baltijos kelio 25-mečio minėjimo 




These identity shifts and transfers served to create a highly realistic system of 
beliefs. Once the boundaries are blurred between the past and the present, and 
between Lithuanian and Ukranian identities, the fear of aggression from Russia 
was a reaction to the real pain caused by it; it wasn’t simply intimidation.
Finally, all of this is highly relevant if we are to understand why there was a 
persistent belief, in the public discourse, to the effect that in the event of Russia’s 
military intervention NATO will probably not step in: in the collective imagination 
of Lithuanians, Russia had already attacked Lithuania. This served to intensify the 
sense of threat coming from the escalating situation, and made the feeling of fear 
very real and justified in the public imagination.
Conclusion
The notion of fear as an emotion and the principles for explaining the 
phenomenon of fear in foreign policy discourses of states presented in this paper 
should be treated as guidelines for further developing the analytic framework for 
understanding the entrenchment of fear in public and official discourses.
The analysis undertaken in this paper demonstrates that treating fear as an 
emotion enables an assessment of the aspects of the nation’s psychology and its 
effect on foreign policy that have hitherto received relatively little attention in 
international relations research. It is shown that it repays to link the contents of 
phenomenon of fear, entrenched in the discourses, with collective memory. Due 
to their function of mobilising and orienting the society, collective memories (and 
traumatic memories in particular) are highly important in the processes of forming 
the society’s identity and ensuring its regeneration. This is why the employment of 
sensitive (traumatic) memories, in defining and explaining threats, connects with 
ontological security. Therefore, the process of constructing the discourse of a threat 
is not limited, pace realists, to the object of the threat (in this case, Russia) or 
the international system, but rather depends on subjective identity routines (e.g., 
significant memories), which can become the guiding principles in understanding 
the threat. All of this suggests that the grasp of threat and the creation of discourses 
of threats have a clear psychological (or emotional) charge, that is, the threat is not 
only encountered by the subject but also subjectively experienced, that is, feel fear. 
Therefore, the understanding of threat also cannot be treated as a mere encounter 
of it.
The definition of mnemonic-emotive agent discussed in the paper suggests 
that memories and emotions can become a political tool in legitimising certain 
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political practices. We should note, however, that politicians lack complete control 
over collective memories and emotions. What they do is employ rather than single-
handedly create them. However, with regard to the methodology for analysis of 
fear proposed in this paper (which distinguishes two levels of emotion as it arises 
in the society, namely the conscious arousal of it and its nonconscious experience), 
one should not be led conclude that rational and consciously articulated actions 
are entirely of no importance. Those who arouse fear, that is, the mnemonic-
emotive agents, might be acting very rationally and tendentiously in giving rise 
to and strengthening fear. Nevertheless, according to the present author, attempts 
to identify the true nature of effect of emotion of fear should focus on the level of 
nonconscious experience of the emotion, the level which escapes complete control 
and manipulation of the consciously acting mnemonic-emotive agents.
Although the narrative of threat from Russia created by President Grybauskaitė 
cannot be fully identified with Lithuania’s national narrative of the threat from 
Russia, it nevertheless shows how one of the most influential discourse managers 
represents the threat and creates the emotional context of fear. Narratives from 
the collective memory (especially the traumatic memories) are used as arguments 
to explain the level and scope of threat. This indicates that one of the prominent 
features of Lithuania’s identity structure are traumatic experiences (occupation, 
deportations), which were activated in Lithuanian-Russian relations from 2014 
and have since become an important narrative to explain the Russian policies. 
On the one hand, this goes some way towards explaining why the reaction by the 
Lithuanian president and other officials was highly sensitive. On the other, this 
shows that Lithuania’s narrative of the threat from Russia should be assessed within 
the context of ontological security.
The assessment of threat based on the imagery from traumatic memories 
and the formation of discourse of fear is important for understanding the social 
dimension of Lithuania-Russia relations. For instance, the narrative to the effect 
that Russia seeks to attack Lithuania is based not so much on the logic of geopolitics 
but rather on the imagery of collective memory. This might be one of the reasons 
why Lithuania’s official discourse largely lacks clear and consistent message that 
Lithuania, as a member of both the EU and NATO, is safe (from the point of view 
of military deterrence) and is not under threat (in the period at hand) of physical 
destruction. The country’s discourse of Lithuania-Russia relations is therefore likely 
to continue to concentrate on collective memories that invoke narratives of the 
emotions of anger and revenge. In other words, the dynamics of said relations will 
be delineated by the emotive discourse that is introverted in character.
